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Admiral David Glasgow Farragut (August 5, 1864)
A 64-year-old man is referred to your clinic with an
asymptomatic 5.0-cm abdominal aortic aneurysm (AAA)
found by ultrasound screening at the local shopping mall.
He is otherwise in good health with no risk factors for
accelerated rupture. The patient’s father died from a rup-
tured AAA and he is quite fretful, requesting repair as soon
as possible. He lost his job months ago and allowed his
medical insurance to lapse, but he has some CDs, owns his
home outright, and, as expected, is willing to forfeit every-
thing to be rid of this threat. In 6 months he will be able to
scrimp by on Social Security and a modest pension. You
offer the option of nonoperative surveillance, which is
summarily dismissed. Because you and the hospital where
your practice is located attract considerable international
patients, you are aware of the enormity of charges imposed
on those without insurance. What should you do?
A. Explain the economics of waiting until he can enroll in
Medicare.
B. Go ahead and operate. The hospital will write it off as a
bad debt.
C. Call the hospital administrator and negotiate his price
downward.
D. Go ahead and operate. If you don’t and the aneurysm
ruptures, you could be sued.
E. Operate. He will just get someone else and you will lose
the case.
Calling medicine a business knocks off the top hat of its
professionalism image. Yet, surgeons make a good living
exchanging restorative, sometimes even curative, services
for greenbacks. And medical institutions, hospitals, practice
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858groups, and our billing operations are in every sense com-
plex businesses. The principal driver of physicians’ recent
reaffirmations of professionalism is concern that over-
commercialization has swayed physicians from their ancient
ethos.1,2
As in few other major purchases, even though the cost
may be high enough to negatively effect future lifestyle, one
of the rarest questions from patients involves the cost of
treatment.3 When McKneally interviewed patients having
major surgery about their process of deciding, he found
that the idealistic shared-decision-making model of lawyers
and bioethicists was better described as an entrustment
process, for the decision had already been made to defer to
the surgeon’s expertise prior to meeting the surgeon.4
Since the entrustment process sweeps aside matters of life
and limb, cost becomes but a trifle; the treatment’s neces-
sity takes priority in the patient’s thinking. One’s life,
health, or even the outside chance to temporarily avoid
dying is, as MasterCard ads stress, “priceless.”
When the patient does not bring up costs, it is unlikely
that the physician will initiate the discussion. The patient’s
financial status can sometimes be guessed by appearances,
but clerks in the hospital business office are the only ones
who know accurately. Physicians may be aware of their
customary charges for a procedure but excepting the most
common insurers, most physicians are unaware of what the
patient’s share of their bill will be and are certainly un-
schooled in ranges of hospital charges or the host of sup-
portive physician’s charges.5
Recommendations for operations are based firmly on
the criteria termed indications from medical antiquity. In-
dications, well known to all, according to Stedman’s are,
“The basis for initiation of a treatment for a disease or of a
diagnostic test; may be furnished by a knowledge of the
cause, by the symptoms present, or by the nature of the
disease.” Indications in the case of aneurysms, as in most
diseases with minimal symptoms, derive from favorable
risk–benefit ratios. Since in our present state of knowledge
abdominal aneurysm repairs have associated mortality and
aneurysms vary in their risk of rupture, the risk–benefit
ratio is quite important. The risk of rupture must clearly
exceed the risk to life for repair to be indicated.
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society’s threshold for repair, but its recommendation in-
cludes taking account of the patient’s preference in the
decision about surgical management vs watchful waiting.6
One might rationalize that endovascular repair obsolesces
those recommendations, but the available evidence is not
yet there7 and, in this era of evidence-based practice, col-
lective expert practice recommendations should not be
altered by unsubstantiated opinions. In this marginal but
acceptable situation, operative therapy otherwise would be
indicated. Should the patient’s financial situation make a
difference? Should those people without funds be treated
differently? If so, would that result in an ethically unaccept-
able, two-tiered medical system?
A two-tiered medical system is obviously unacceptable,
ethically, if that means that those with a source of payment
receive the accepted standard of care and those without do
not.8 Dating from the Neanderthals, societies have always
victimized their politically weak such as the poor and evi-
dence still exists that there are remnants of differences in
care of the poor in America. Great strides toward the
elimination of differences have been registered, and what
continues is contemptible.
The ethical objection to such a two-tiered system ap-
plies to necessary treatment based on the ability to pay, not
to discretionary treatment. The ethical challenges concern-
ing cost to the patient in this case therefore differ and are
more subtle. Cost should not be the sole or even the
primary determinant of medical therapy, but physicians’
favored economic status should not blind one to the finan-
cial hardship major surgical therapy can have on less affluent
patients.
“The fully insured middle-class people who become ill
with critical or life-threatening illnesses, it can completely
ruin their financial health,” says Beth Darnley, chief pro-
gram officer for the Patient Advocate foundation. “Bank-
ruptcy is just the tip of the iceberg: 29 million Americans
are in medical debt,” says Jennifer Edwards of the Com-
monwealth Fund, a private foundation that supports re-
search on health and social issues.”9
Holden made the case that cost should be a part of the
informed consent process as so, “If we are proposing a
treatment that provides a slight improvement in outcome,
compared with the second choice treatment, at an added
cost equal to an around-the-world luxury vacation or a new
luxury car, it is incumbent on us to tell our patients about
the less expensive treatment and let them decide how they
want to spend their money. I suspect more than a few will
opt for the more economical treatment.”10
This final comment should be taken with a note of
caution. In this case, the fiduciary responsibility of the
physician to this patient includes consideration of the im-
pact of discretionary, clinically unwarranted hurrying of
surgery on the patient’s future lifestyle and therefore his
health and well-being. The best predictor of health status in
our society is socioeconomic status; having surgery now,
rather than waiting until he is Medicare-eligible, will dras-
tically reduce this patient’s socioeconomic status. The likelyimpact that long-term increased worry and stress, which his
suddenly reduced economic circumstances will almost cer-
tainly induce, present ethical significance for the physician
and thus fall under fiduciary responsibility.
By proceeding, our patient will encounter an unyield-
ing reality. In these times of scarcity, many hospitals have
developed the strategy of vigorously, even harshly, pursu-
ing outstanding debt.11 That pursuit and the likelihood
that payment would be demanded on admission or shortly
thereafter exclude option B, because it assumes that the
cost-components of this case are not of economic signifi-
cance. But they are.
Option D shows that surgeon is violating the fidu-
ciary role in decision-making. The evidence base for D is
weak: Deciding what therapy to give based upon medi-
colegal risks frequently misidentifies those who are likely
to sue.12 Moreover, this option makes self-interest the
overriding consideration, which threatens to distort, if
not undermine, professional expert judgment about
whether surgery is indeed indicated at this time. The
legitimate goal of reducing unnecessary liability should
never be achieved by putting patients at unnecessary,
increased clinical risk.
Option E is a universal excuse that all of us should have
discarded during childhood. Should it be adopted in the
legal code, every drug dealer and child pornographer would
be released with remuneration for false imprisonment. It
also violates the physician’s fiduciary duty by dislocating
decision-making from the patient.
Option C is a thoughtful action but should not be the
first action taken; it should follow a careful explanation
suggested by A. The sequelae of performing surgery in this
case are not simply anatomic. Those economic sequelae
have clinical consequences and the patient needs to be
informed about these and take them into account. There is
a strict legal obligation, called informed refusal, for a phy-
sician to explain the risks that the patient takes when
refusing recommended clinical management. Usually that
management involves intervention, but in this case involves
close observation and considered judgments in the future.
The physician should take advantage of the legal obligation
of fulfilling the requirements of informed refusal—explain-
ing to the patient the risks he is taking be electing surgery at
this time—to engage in the ethically significant task of
persuading the patient to reconsider. Apprising him of the
psychosocial risks he is taking by taking on the enormous
financial burdens of surgery now and of the clinical risks to
his health and well being of doing so become key educa-
tional components of persuading him to reconsider.
Decisions about clinical management should not only
be informed, but also voluntary. Faden and Beauchamp
explain that this means that the decision-making process
and its outcome should be free of substantially controlling
influences, including such substantially controlling psycho-
logic influences as unreasoning fear. Part of implementing
option A therefore should be a careful exploration with the
patient of his attitudes and feelings toward this father’s
death and educating him about the fact that the current size
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high risk of death within the next year. The goal of this
conversation with the patient should be to mitigate the
potentially distorting influence of an unreasoning fear on
this decision-making processes.
The consideration of the future financial impact on
patients we treat sometimes must enter the equation, espe-
cially when one can reliably predict serious biopsychosocial
consequences of nontrivial financial costs that can be safely
(enough) postponed. Somewhere back in folklore there
was a belief that if you saved someone’s life, you became
responsible for them forever. Thank goodness, it was a
myth.
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